



# **NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL**

**MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA**

## **THESIS**

**FRAMING CULTURAL ATTRIBUTES FOR HUMAN  
REPRESENTATION IN MILITARY TRAINING AND  
SIMULATIONS**

by

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September 2008

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**FRAMING CULTURAL ATTRIBUTES FOR HUMAN REPRESENTATION IN  
MILITARY TRAINING AND SIMULATIONS**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
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## **ABSTRACT**

This thesis provides insight to improve training of personnel that will support United States Security, Stability, Transformation and Reconstruction (SSTR) operations in the social and cultural context of the Middle East. SSTR operations require competencies far beyond conventional fighting skills. Necessary skills include rounded knowledge about the history and culture, and language, of the indigenous people in the operational area. Through personal interviews, social science research, and historical literature reviews, this thesis provides a framework for training military personnel on culture and social interactions using modeling and simulation. I propose the use of computer agents, bots or avatars with the cultural/social attributes explained within to be a solution to the lack of training in this field. These enhanced interaction skills will further support regional stability, increase cooperative engagements, and decrease insurgent activities.

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## **LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS**

SSTR -	Security Stability Transformation and Reconstruction
TAF -	Turkish Air force
SO -	Stability Operations
CBT -	Computer Based Trainer
GBT -	Game Based Trainer
NGO -	Non Governmental Organization.
PMESII	Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, and Information
DIME -	Diplomatic, Intelligence. Military, Economic
NAC -	Neighborhood Area Council
DAC -	District Area Council
OIF -	Operation Iraqi Freedom
BILAD Training	Bilateral Training

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# **I. INTRODUCTION**

## **A. BACKGROUND**

The United States military has faced opposition from its adversaries even when its missions are noncombatant. The military has defended, protected, and promoted human rights, diplomacy, and democracy in places around the world that have not welcome American ideals. Societal groups, national or sub-national, have either embraced the U.S.'s stability and reconstruction missions or opposed them; receptivity varies dramatically between European and Middle Eastern populations. This is because there are significant cultural similarities between the U.S. and Europe and far fewer between the U.S. and the Islamic nations of the Middle East. These cultural differences must be explored, understood, and implemented in the training of military personnel (soldiers, sailors, Marines, airmen, and coast guardsmen).

Military missions have grown in complexity in recent years to involve a mix of peace-building tasks (e.g., peacekeeping or nation building) and warfighting responsibilities (e.g., peace enforcement or combating violent rebellions). This complexity requires warfighters at all levels to integrate tactical proficiency with the leveraging of nonmilitary advantages, including the building of trust and alliances with local networks and individuals (Kifner, 2006; Scales 2006; and Wong 2004). This research is designed to provide insight into the effects of the United States military's security, stability, transformation and reconstruction (SSTR) operations in the social and cultural context of the Middle East. In addition, the research suggests social and cultural behaviors to be implemented in post-conflict, operational-training simulations.

Most American military operations have taken place on foreign soil, and most of those operations have been conventional in nature (national army versus national army). However, in recent times and especially since September 11, 2001, military operations have grown beyond major combat operations, to peace

enforcement and nation building. This complexity requires warfighters at every level to understand the political, military, economic, social, infrastructural and informational (PMESII) environment of the operating area. As national policies have shifted from total war in WWII to “winning hearts and minds” in Operation Enduring Freedom, it is vital to understand societal relationships, trust, and cultural awareness for the success of peace and stability operations.

As war and postwar transformations continue, it is important for us to understand completely the barriers between our attempts at peaceful stability operations and the reality of our actions. The military as a whole is not prepared to operate extensively in stability-operations (SO) environments, or to conduct influence operations that adequately consider the views of other national cultures. The DoD has recently made “cultural competence” a priority (Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 2006 and DoD Directive 1322.18, “Military Training,” September 3, 2004). A novel method of implementing cultural competence as a priority is through computer-based training (CBT) simulations. This thesis will provide a framework for incorporating sociocultural relationships in CBT.

## **B. CULTURAL NEGLIGENCE**

According to Lewis Rockwell, author of *Iraq and the Democratic Empire*, and Lola Wheeler, who asserts that “79% of Iraqis oppose the U.S. occupation,” there is an overwhelming opinion that Americans are pushing their Western, democratic, Christian beliefs onto the countries they liberate and destroying everything else. Unfortunately for the warfighter, this opinion stirs dissension against Special Operations (SO) forces. As one Iraqi journalist states:

Citing security issues, U.S. troops have cut down precious date trees, which is often the life-sustaining source of many Iraqi villages, burned and razed crops, agricultural yields and fields, drained swamps, and burned grassy knolls where it is alleged that Iraqi ‘terrorists’ are hiding.

Now, evidence is coming to light that American soldiers at the very least are negligent of Iraq's agriculture and at the very most are carrying out a systematic campaign of punishing farmers and their farmlands on the suspicion that they harbor "Saddam loyalists" or other anti-American forces.

Ironically, the punitive measures themselves are spawning a new breed of anti-American might that cares little for Saddam and even less for politics. The psyche of the Middle Eastern farmer, whether he be in Jordan, Upper Egypt or in the Tigris-Euphrates river valleys of Iraq,

is that life is based on the land, and the land is the pride and honor of every farmer. When the land is defiled and violated, it becomes incumbent upon the farmer to avenge the honor of his family and tribe. (Firas Al-Atraqchi freelance columnist for Iraq in transition; [http://www.islamonline.net/English/In\\_Depth/Iraq\\_Aftermath/2003/10/article\\_13.shtml](http://www.islamonline.net/English/In_Depth/Iraq_Aftermath/2003/10/article_13.shtml) 21 July 2008).

Another example of American ignorance to culture was in the public and gruesome display of the slain Odai and Qusai Hussein's bodies on Iraqi television. Odai and Qusai were the sons of the former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein. The U.S. intent was to show the Iraqi people that the former dictator and regime was no more and that liberation had come, however the Iraqi public took the display as disrespectful and repugnant (Walsh 2003). Iraqi people also saw the video as a reemergence of colonial imperialism. Proper social cultural training could have given our warfighters a cultural intelligence that may have prevented both of the above situations.

### **C. OBJECTIVE**

The first objective of this thesis is to make cultural understanding a critical component of the pre-deployment training for all military. Secondly, this work is intended to connect behavioral characteristics or cultural attributes and computer technology to set a standard for modeling representative social and cultural behaviors of computer agents and avatars. Lastly, the objective is to give the

war planners operational insight into what scenarios warfighters face and what training objectives are required to be successful in those endeavors.

#### **D. APPROACH**

Forty-five minute interviews were conducted with one professor, four Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) students and a Navy lieutenant information professional (IP). The professor, born in Najaf, Iraq, teaches Arabic, Islamic theology, and Middle Eastern political science on the university level. The four warfighters, from three different services (Navy, Marines, and Army), are currently stationed at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, and have been deployed to Iraq at least once since 2003. The Navy IP has the most recent deployment to Iraq, from March 2008 through September 2008. All participants were male. All warfighters held roles or responsibilities during their deployment that included formal and informal interactions with members of the local Iraqi population. In addition, excerpts from interviews conducted by an American social scientist in Israel are included because of related responses in a different operational environment. The social scientist interviewed one leader of a Christian humanitarian non-governmental organization (female) and one Israeli Defense Force NGO liaison (male).

The interviewees are referred to by their occupation in the remainder of the document. Full interview transcriptions are in Appendix A - E:

Army Armor

Army

Marine Pilot

Navy Informational Professional IP(1)

Navy Informational Professional IP(2)

Professor of Middle Eastern Studies

Christian Non Governmental Organization Leader CNGOL

Israeli Defense Force Officer IDF

Social Scientist SS

The interview protocol included a script of up to twenty-five questions presented to participants, addressing a series of topics including:

- Any situations of positive cooperative engagements
- The types of interactions experienced
- The cultural differences experienced
- Any social ties or separators experienced
- Actions that induced conflict
- Actions that inspired conflict resolutions
- How knowledge of civil and social structured was formed
- Pre-deployment training received
- Any suggested training for future warfighters

Content analysis was performed on the information collected during the interviews. From the responses and the literature review, the researcher identified two key issues: (1) the current state of pre-deployment training with respect to culture (2) attributes that enhance, deteriorate, or describe a group's willingness to cooperate.

## **E. ORGANIZATION OF THIS THESIS**

The thesis is organized in the following manner. The next chapter, which is the Literature Review, contains definitions, and a literary understanding of vast social science view about culture and theory. Chapter II continues with social science models that introduce terminology and concepts. Chapter III is dedicated to explaining current military training, identifies levels of cultural training, and suggests new implementations of training. Chapter IV contains quotes from various interviews to support topics covered in the literature review. Further, Chapter IV highlights situations warfighters have faced and suggests those situations become gaming scenarios and training objectives. Finally, Chapter IV gives a representation of the attributes and system dynamics

described in this thesis. Chapter V includes the conclusions and recommendations for future work section. Following Chapter V is the list of references and appendixes. The appendixes contain the complete questions and answers of the interviews conducted for this research.

## **II. LITERATURE REVIEW**

### **A. INTRODUCTION**

This chapter provides a summary of findings from a literature search from studies relating to social science and cultural. The subsections within this chapter are what are believed to be an accurate means of capturing a society's cultural behavior. Further, the information helps identify important considerations for military operations, providing a basis and motivation for examination of training needs in later chapters.

### **B. DEFINITIONS**

Due to the ongoing SSTR operations in Iraq, the main society of focus in this thesis is Iraq; but many social and cultural attributes are common among Arabic and Muslim people, such that training recommendations can be generalized to most of the Middle East and some of North Africa. The aim of this thesis is to build a framework to represent some effective societal behaviors in military training simulations and explore training requirements across services. We begin by defining societies in accordance with past research. A society is “a grouping of individuals characterized by patterns of relationships between these individuals that may have distinctive culture and institutions, or, more broadly, an economic, social, and industrial infrastructure in which a varied multitude of people or peoples are a part. Members of a society may be from different ethnic groups. A society may be a particular people, such as the Saxons, a nation state, such as Bhutan, or a broader cultural group, such as a Western or enduring and cooperating social group whose members have developed organized patterns of relationships through interaction with one another” (Merriam-Webster Dictionary).

Culture is defined as “the total, generally organized way of life, including values, norms, institutions, and artifacts, that is passed on from generation to generation by learning alone” (Hoult 1969). This is the definition that I will be

using in reference to culture, but will also add that culture encompasses physical appearance, internal knowledge, and external behavior common to a cultural group. A cultural group is defined as a “group of people who identify with the group through a shared trait, such as gender, race, religion, ethnicity, nationality, regionality, age, economic status, social class, education, or occupation” (van Lent, Core, Solomon, Rosenberg, McAlinden, & Carpenter 2007).

Cultures are dynamic systems. They emerge from a particular setting and they change as that setting evolves over time. Cultures are composed of integrated components rather than a haphazard collection of interchangeable parts. One change has repercussions throughout the system. Rapid or haphazard introduction of new, contrary ideas can create shock or confusion among people who have been heavily indoctrinated within a culture that limits external communication and open discourse. One result can be *anomie*. As Émile Durkheim and later theorists argue, *anomie* is a reaction against or a retreat from the regulatory social controls of society. People who feel alienated from the surrounding society may become lawless, lacking an adequate set of values to guide their behavior and unable to find their place in society. To avoid this, it is important that we understand existing cultural patterns and how they are likely to be affected by introduction of new and different values that accompany modernization. A culture cannot adapt to the cognitive demands of industrialization without also altering social and educational patterns. Industrialization generally brings changes in reasoning and education along with changes in family structure. The integrated nature of cultural components means that some cultural elements regularly occur together; those occurrences characterize types of cultures. Industrial nations are likely to show more social and cognitive similarities than non-industrial nations. (Berry 1986; Segall, Dasen, Berry, & Poortinga 1990; Triandis 1994; & Klien 2004).



## **C. THE SOCIAL-SCIENCE VIEW OF CULTURE**

### **1. The Importance of Theory and Culture**

There are many different theoretical opinions that describe the concept of culture. As social creatures, we are curious to understand why the world works as it does. Social scientists research to find out if general rules or laws apply to understanding why humans do what they do and believe what they do about how the world is constructed. They also ask if the world can be understood only through our own subjective lenses, which are shaped by personal and societal experiences, or if there are less subjective methods and tools that can be used.

Theories provide explanatory power and influence or guide research; in addition they increase the body of existing knowledge. As is commonly stated in the world of science “Theory cannot be definitely proven, only supported by a great deal of information or proven false” (Salzman 2001; Lichbach and Zuckerman 2002). Both theories and facts are needed because theories without facts lack substance, and facts without theories are insignificant or fall into the category of opinion (Salzman 2001; Lichbach and Zuckerman 2002). Theory explains general trends that can be applied to many specific instances or particular cases. Theories can help answer likely questions about the probability of an outcome. Therefore, theory and understanding why the world works and why people do what they do is very relevant to military operations. (Chandler 2005)

## **D. SOCIAL-SCIENCE MODELS**

Several social science models are described below to introduce important terminology and concepts.

## **1. Normative or Informative**

Normative social influence conforms an individual to the positive expectations of another. Stated differently, it is the influence of other people that leads us to conform, in order to be liked and accepted by them—often leading to public compliance (Aronson, Wilson, & Akert 2005). Informative social influence is defined as an influence to accept information obtained from another as evidence about reality (Deutsch & Gerard 1954). Positive expectations refer to those expectations whose fulfillment by another leads, to or reinforces, positive feelings, and whose nonfulfillment leads to the opposite. In general, one would expect that the strength of these internalized self-expectations would reflect the individual's prior experiences as sources of need satisfaction, by conforming to his own judgments or by self reliance he has won approval from such significant others as his parents (Deutsch & Gerard 1995). Though not equivalent, Arab and American society both exhibit normative and informative social behavior. The Arab world with its collective society (discussed below), seems to be heavily influenced by the group's expectation of behavior. Avatars in computer-based training that represent human behavior where the agents are of the same faith and culture should possess attributes that demonstrate normative or informative social behaviors.

## **2. Trust and Normative Social Influence**

Trust is the firm reliance on the integrity or stability of a person or thing (American Heritage Dictionary, fourth edition 2004). Generally, group members are more likely to take the judgments of other group members as trusting evidence for forming judgments about reality and, hence, they would be more susceptible to informative social influence than would non-members (Deutsch & Gerard 1954). The greater trust usually reflects more experience of the reliability of the judgments of other members and more confidence in the benevolence of their motivations. However, when group members have had no prior experience together and when it is apparent in both the group and nongroup situations that

the others are motivated and in a position to report correct judgments, there is no reason to expect differential susceptibility to informative social influence among group and non-group members (Deutsch & Gerard 1954).

### **3. Activisms and Collective Efficacy**

There is a strong relationship between the level of social and community problems in a neighborhood and the level of individual and community involvement and collective efficacy for that neighborhood. Collective efficacy is the aggregated belief of members in their group's ability to accomplish their shared goals (Foster-Fishman, Cantillon, Pierce, & Van Egeren 2007). Different elements of neighborhood conditions are more or less important to foster different types and levels of resident involvement. For example, perceptions of neighborhood problems predict whether an individual becomes involved, but perceived strength of neighborhood leadership can be the strongest predictor of an individual's level of activity. Furthermore, in economically poor communities, inclusion of residents as architects of and participants in the change process can produce a healthy community and an active citizenry. (Foster-Fishman, Cantillon, Pierce, & Van Egeren 2007).

Middle Eastern countries, and Iraq in particular, have exemplified this finding. When individuals actively and willingly participate in the rebuilding process, views of the Western world can change from Iraqi occupiers to community aides. This research suggests that in modeling human behavior for simulation of reconstruction operations, collective efficacy must be incorporated in the avatar's attributes.

### **4. Personality Profiles of Cultures**

It is difficult to understand what cultural attributes are required to model a human society. We generally group nations by their language, religion, industry, poverty, and political system, and so on. I agree that on the surface these generalizations work well to separate groups. However, I feel that research done

by Dr. Geert Hofstede, Emeritus Professor, Maastricht University better compares national cultures than the groupings previously listed. Geert Hofstede's value-survey module is designed for measuring culturally determined differences between matched samples of respondents from different countries and regions. It consists of twenty content questions and six demographic questions. I will use and explain some of his concepts in comparing the U.S. and the Arab World (Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates). I won't explain every dimension of Hofstede's findings because statistics are not available for "long time orientation" in the Arab world but will highlight a few that I believe are important.

Culture is more often a source of conflict than of synergy. Cultural differences are a nuisance at best and often a disaster.

Dr. Geert Hofstede,

According to Hofstede, the power-distance index, or PDI, is the extent of acceptance and expectance of unequally distributed power by the less powerful members of an organization or group. PDI expresses power and economic and social disparity from the less-prosperous point of view, and not the opposite. This suggest that followers, as much as leaders, endorse a society's level of inequality. A comparison of the American and the Arab worlds follows.

Uncertainty avoidance (UA) deals with a society's capacity to endure uncertainty and ambiguity.

It indicates to what extent a culture programs its members to feel either uncomfortable or comfortable in unstructured situations. Further, UA is the extent to which the individuals in a culture feel threatened by unknown situations. (Hofstede 2003)

In cultures where high-uncertainty avoidance is the norm, the emotional sentiment is that everything different is dangerous, and uncertainty is limited by implementation of strict rules and laws. Philosophically, high-UA cultures believe in the absolute truth and believe that they possess it. However, if the society is

open to new things and changes, it is expected to have a low degree of uncertainty avoidance. Those cultures are also more tolerant of different opinions; permit different views of the world; and seem to follow fewer rules.

People within the high UA cultures are more phlegmatic and contemplative, and not expected by their environment to express emotions. (Hofstede 2003)

The United States has a power-distance index (PDI) of forty, compared to the world average of fifty-five.

This is indicative of a greater equality between societal levels, including government, organizations, and even within families. This orientation reinforces a cooperative interaction across power levels and creates a more stable cultural environment. (Hofstede 2003)

The uncertainty-avoidance index (UAI) ranking for the U.S. is forty-six, compared to the world average of sixty-four. The low UAI ranking suggests that American society has fewer rules and does not attempt to control all outcomes and results. Further, it suggests that there is a greater tolerance for a number of ideas, beliefs, and thoughts.

The Arab countries have a high PDI of eighty and UAI of sixty-eight.

These societies are highly rule-oriented with laws, rules, regulations, and controls; more likely to follow a caste system that does not allow significant upward mobility of its citizens. (Hofstede 2003)

These countries have developed a culture that reduces the amount of uncertainty, while inequalities of power and wealth have been allowed to grow within the society.

Furthermore, members of this type of society expect the leaders to separate themselves from the group. When combined, a large PDI and high UAI creates a situation where

Leaders have virtually ultimate power and authority, and the rules, laws, and regulations developed by those in power, reinforce their

own leadership and control. Hofstede says that it is not unusual for new leadership to arise from armed insurrection and gaining the ultimate power, rather than gaining it from diplomatic or democratic change. (Hofstede 2003)

The obvious differences in societies between the Arab world and the U.S. make interacting very challenging. Military personnel from a free and open society must understand that they will be operating with Iraqis, Egyptians, Kuwaitis or others who have a different internal rule set and whose motivations are different. The warfighter must also understand that in cooperative engagements, it will not be his job or duty to change the society, but to enable it to gain stability.

## **5. Masculinity Index**

The masculinity index (MAS) describes the degree to which masculine values like competitiveness and the acquisition of wealth are valued over feminine values like relationship building and quality of life. (Hofstede 2003)

The average MAS of all fifty-six societies in Hofstede's study is 50.2. The Arab World MAS ranking is fifty-two, which is only slightly higher than the average, while the United States has a ranking of sixty-two.

For the Arab world, this would indicate that while women in the Arab World are limited in their rights, it may be due more to Muslim religion rather than a cultural paradigm. (Hofstede 2003)

For the U.S., this indicates that the country experiences a higher degree of gender differentiation of roles; this stimulates a female population that becomes more assertive and competitive than women who occupy traditional feminine roles in some other cultures. The equality and acceptance that women receive in the U.S. is totally unacceptable to most Islamic Arab men. Again, modeling and simulation of a society's MAS is important.

## **6. Individualism vs Collectivism**

Individualism (IDV) is an individual's strive to accomplish personal goals rather than group or collective interests, also considered selfishness.

Where bonds between individuals are loose: everyone is expected to look after themselves and their immediate family. In the collectivist society, people from birth onwards are integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups, often extended families which continue protecting them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty (Hofstede 2001).

The Arab world's lowest cultural dimension is the Individualism ranking, at thirty-eight compared to a world average of sixty-four. A score of thirty-eight means that the Arab world is a collectivist society and is manifested in a close long-term commitment to the associated group, family, extended family, or extended relationships. Loyalty overrides most other societal rules in a collectivist culture.

## **7. Long-Term Orientation LTO**


Long-term orientation deals with virtue regardless of truth, says Hofstede.

Values associated with long-term orientation are thrift and perseverance; values associated with short-term orientation are respect for tradition, fulfilling social obligations, and protecting one's "face." Both the positively and the negatively rated values of this dimension are found in the teachings of Confucius, the most influential Chinese philosopher who lived around 500 B.C.; however, the dimension also applies to countries without a Confucian heritage. (Hofstede 2003)

There is no LTO comparison of American society and the Arab World because there is no research to support describing the Arabic world culture in this regard.

Figure 1 illustrates the compared societal attributes between the American and Arab worlds using Hofstede's five dimensions, described above. It is easily recognizable that the two societies are very different. The groups are so much

different that one could expect conflict or difficulty in partnering when these two cultures are operating in the same environment.



<b>PDI</b>	Power Distance Index
<b>IDV</b>	Individualism
<b>MAS</b>	Masculinity
<b>UAI</b>	Uncertainty Avoidance Index
<b>LTO</b>	Long-Term Orientation

Figure 1. Hofstede's 5D Comparison of U.S. and Arabic Worlds

## 8. Religion

### a. *Islam*

Islam is a monotheistic religion based on revelations received by the Prophet Muhammad in the 7th century, which were later recorded in the Koran (Qur'an), Islam's sacred text, and in Al-Hadith, which describes the words and deeds of Muhammad. The faith spread rapidly and today Islam is the second largest religion in the world. The Arabic word *slam* means "submission," reflecting the religion's central tenet of submitting to the will of God. Islamic practices are defined by the Five Pillars of Islam: faith, prayer, fasting, pilgrimage and alms (<http://www.religionfacts.com/islam/>).

Islam is the most-practiced religion in the Arab world. This religion and its laws are the primary factors that influence how people of this society



behave. The national laws and religious laws are much intertwined; in the event of conflicts, religious laws are said to be more important than national laws.

***b. Christianity***

Christianity is a monotheistic religion centered on the life and teachings of Jesus of Nazareth as presented in the New Testament of the Bible (Catholic Dictionary). Christians believe that Jesus is the only begotten Son of God and the Messiah (Christ) prophesied in the Old Testament, which is part of the written word of God that is common to Christianity and Judaism. To Christians, Jesus Christ is a teacher, the model of a virtuous life, the revealer of God, and most importantly, the savior of humanity, who suffered, died, and was resurrected to bring about salvation from sin. Christians maintain that Jesus ascended into heaven, and most denominations teach that Jesus will return to judge the living and the dead, granting everlasting life to his followers. Christians call the message of Jesus Christ the gospel ("good news") and hence label the written accounts of his ministry as gospels (catholicreference.net).

Christianity is the most-followed religion in America. The United States, since its inception, has incorporated Christian principles of freedom and individual equality, while allowing government to function separate from the church (religion). American society tends to have more individualistic behaviors and free exchange of ideas than are allowed in countries where Islam is the dominant religion.

***c. Historical Conflict between Christianity and Islam***

Historically, the relationship of the Muslims and the Christians has been very complex. Both groups of believers trace their origins to the Jewish religion. The Islamic faith in early years recognized Christianity as a viable religion, but an incomplete truth. Furthermore, Muslims tolerated the existence of Jews and Christians under the rules of *dhimmitude*, or submission of non-Muslims to Muslim rule and taxation. Initial conflict between Muslim and Judeo-

Christian people began when the Jews of Yathrib (renamed Medina by Muhammad) resisted Muhammad's religious leadership following the famous "flight to Medina" in A.D. 622. As explained by an Islamic scholar in the preface to his translation of the Quran,

... the Jews, despite their treaty, now hardly concealed their hostility. They even went so far in flattery of Quraish as to declare the religion of the pagan Arabs superior to Al-Islam. The Prophet was obliged to take punitive action against some of them. The tribe of Bani Nadheer were besieged in their strong towers, subdued and forced to emigrate. (Malik, 2002, page 30)

With the conquest of Medina, Muhammad began building political and military strength that enabled him to quickly dominate the entire Arabic region (Welch, 1997). The caliphs further expanded the Islamic state, expanding quickly over North Africa and the eastern territories as far as what is now Pakistan. In A.D. 711, the Arabs invaded Spain and India. Expansion to the east and west continued until Charles Martel gained victory over the Muslims nears Tours, France, in 732, saving Europe from Muslim domination. The Arabs withdrew from France, but retained their rule in Spain for seven-and-a-half centuries (Welch 1997).

Around A.D. 1096, Europeans responded to the Muslim conquest of Jerusalem and ongoing Muslim incursions into Europe with a large military campaign that came to be called the Crusades. The relationship of the Muslims and the Christians grew more at odds during the Christian Crusades, and later European Colonialism (Esposito 2002). The Christian Crusades were military and religious expeditions launched both against Islam and other Christians. Both Islam and Christianity become involved with mass murder over religion, holy sites, and religious beliefs for centuries. (Cline 2008)

Whether a person is Christian or Muslim or of any other faith (or of no faith), that person will have biases. It is a natural behavior to identify with people of similar religious practices and beliefs and be leery of non-group members. Our warfighters must train to understand their own biases and the

biases of the local citizen. It is imperative that our training models and simulations encompass religion and its biases. I look further at religion and politics in the following section.

**d. Religious and Political Conflicts**

In a manner similar to that of the Soviet–Afghani and Palestinian–Israeli conflicts, the U.S. invasion of Iraq introduced an American-informed democracy as the competing ideology to Islam. This provided a powerful motivation for Muslim Iraqis to fight against coalition forces and the government of Iraq. According to the Middle Eastern Islamic view, democracy is a manmade system that is not rooted in the teachings of Islamic doctrine or based in Sharia Law. It unjustly places authority in the hands of men, and this authority belongs solely to God. It also offers secular laws that often compete against, or even contradict, Sharia. The suggestion that democracy would be helpful in Iraq implies that Islam and God’s rules are not sufficient for the needs of the people. This is highly offensive to many Muslims. Seyyid Qutb, a noted Egyptian Islamist, asserts in his book *Milestones* that

the supremacy of the Islamic way of life at the expense of manmade systems like democracy which Muslims should reject as a form of jahiliyyah or state of ignorance of the guidance from God. (Qutb1981)

Further, the inclusive nature of democracy, as advocated by the U.S. in Iraq, denies the ideologies and differences between religious groups that often characterize each other as apostate. More commonly, this refers to the differences between Sunni and Shia Muslims, but it also includes other groups that hold different beliefs. The label apostate is especially significant because it automatically places the apostate in a lower status than a rightly believing Muslim. Many Islamic extremists believe Islam calls for believers to kill apostates, so this makes equality at the polling site an ideological oxymoron. From Hadith texts:

Whoever changes his religion shall be killed. (Abu Dawood)

It is not lawful to kill a man who is a Muslim except for one of the three reasons: Kufr (disbelief) after accepting Islam... (Abu Dawood)

Not all Sunnis or Shia believe that the other group is apostate; a significant amount of literature disputes this assertion. The growing appeal of Salafism among Sunnis in Iraq makes reconciling at the polls a very difficult proposition (Zarqawi and Other Islamists to the Iraqi People 2005).

Democracy is based on the principle of freedom of association and of forming political parties and the like, no matter what the creed, idea, and ethics of these parties may be. This principle is null and void according to [Islamic] law for a number of reasons . . . one of them is that voluntary recognition of the legality of heretical parties acquiesces in heresy . . . acquiescence in heresy is heresy (Baker, Hamilton, & Eagleburger 2006).

Another reason that many Iraqis reject the American version of democracy is because they believe it to be a morally corrupt system devoid of any redeeming values. The freedom that democracy provides allows people and nations to pursue their individual objectives without respect to morality or the good of the community. If left unchecked, many Islamic writers believe that the Muslim world would open itself up to social ills present in many Western societies such as the erosion of the family, pornography, drug abuse, and greed (Hoskins 2007).

In summary, it is vital to include in any model describing or predicting cultural behavior the interactions between religious and political systems. In this case it is Islam versus American democracy.

## **9. Relationships/ Social Ties: Informal, Formal, Family**

The core of all relationships and social ties are built through learned examples of the family structure. People tend to mirror the pattern of interaction within their family in relationships outside their family. Furthermore, they often

encourage outgroup members to conform to their family traditions or reject building new relationships that do not conform. Warfighters must understand, through training, the local family structure, in order to negotiate and operate in a foreign environment.

In the Middle East, the family unit is the social institution to begin with if one is interested in people and people's lives. It is also the institution to study if one is interested in political, social, and economic change in the area, because it formulates and articulates that change daily. Leaders in the Middle East may argue about the functionality of the institution of the family and the roles women and men should assume, but they have not yet found an institution to replace it, either in real life or in ideology (Khurshid).

The difference in political priorities and rhetoric between the West and the Middle East has to do with the functions and powers of the family group. In traditional Middle Eastern society, the family as a basic unit performs many of the functions now expected of the state. For thousands of years, in most societies around the world including Middle Eastern society, the family group, in the words of Arab sociologist Halim Barakat, "has constituted the basic socio-economic unit of production and (has been) at the center of social organization in all three Arab patterns of living (bedouin, rural and urban) and particularly among tribesmen, peasants, and urban poor. As such the family also constituted the dominant social institution through which persons and groups inherited their religious, social class and cultural identities." (Lerner 1958)

The family provides economic and emotional support to its members, which might consist of groups as small as twenty or as large as 200. Not only are mother, father, and children included in the definition of the family, but also grandparents, uncles, aunts, cousins, to several degrees on both sides of the marital bridge (Khurshid). An individual inherits his or her religious, class, and cultural identity, which is reinforced by the customs and rules of the group. In addition, in exchange for the allegiance of its members, the group serves as an employment agency, insurance company, family-counseling service, elderly home, bank, teacher, home for the ill, and shelter in time of economic need (Khurshid).

## **E SUMMARY**

There are varied opinions of how cultures are defined and created. The objective of this chapter was to give a quick overview then identify culture through a number of characteristic which describes why humans behave in particular patterns. These characteristics or attributes are this researcher's suggested standard for modeling a society of people. An incomplete list of attributes are listed below, the remaining attributes will be identified in later chapters.

- Masculinity
- Individualism vs. Collectivism
- Religion
- Social Ties
- Uncertainty Avoidance
- Power Distance

The overarching purpose for modeling a human society of people is to improve the service member's skills as a warfighter, diplomat, and negotiator. Those skills are only enhanced through experience and training and the next chapter gives insight into training.

### **III. TRAINING**

#### **A. INTRODUCTION**

The shift toward multinational operations, together with a growing complexity of work environments, presents a problem: intelligent and thoughtful people from different national groups sometimes identify different problems, make different plans, negotiate and coordinate differently, and make different decisions during complex cognitive tasks. Cutting-edge technology and procedures, carefully and competently developed in one nation, may be incompatible with the equipment, procedures, and professional practices of other nations. Training packages that are effective in one nation can receive harsh criticism in others. Professionals often struggle during interactions with competent, well-meaning peers from other nations. These problems can compromise productivity and the quality of work.

A mismatch that plagues peacekeeping operations occurs when personnel from Western nations try to help those from emerging nations. In their well-intended attempts to support development, they may push for the rapid acceptance of innovative technology. They want to master the difficulties facing the host nation and provide a better life. If the people of the host nation differ in their approach to change, Westerners may view them as lazy and uncaring. The Westerners may be viewed as dominating and disrespectful by hosts who are more fatalistic and relationship oriented. Each cultural misstep compounds the problem and makes winning the peace an increasingly difficult and remote possibility.

Effective training can correct such deficiencies and create a military force that is better able to interact in diverse societies and cultures. This chapter examines current training to identify weaknesses and gaps that need to be addressed.

## **B. CURRENT TRAINING**

Training for military personnel involved in nation building should include cultural awareness, cultural history, manners and traditions, social structure, and communication styles (Brown 2007; Gooren 2006; Kifner 2006; Scales 2006).

The services currently utilize a variety of programs that only provide an orientation-level overview with some language and customs and courtesies mixed in.

It was like a thirty-minute slide presentation, it was so ridiculous. Don't point and don't show them the bottom of your feet (Marine).

I received cultural awareness training for approx two to three hours total (left hand is dirty hand, accept food or drink when offered, etc) (Navy IP 1).

Only a couple of programs have detailed cross-cultural communications training.

For OIF3 the training was centered around what I would call Iraqi experts. The classes were set up where he brought in Middle Eastern experts that taught like a seminar type fashion, like college credit type classes with so many hours of classroom lecture. We learned about history, Iraqi customs taboos and things like that. We learned about money how the culture in Iraq inter-operated with each other and it was very watered down but it was better than nothing (Army Armor).

The programs tend to be at the basic-knowledge level, which is adequate for traditional large-scale combat operations but not for the realities of today's military operations, where tactical decisions by an individual can have strategic consequences. The current military training programs are missing a clear guidance and flexible framework for understanding the fluid and mutually dependent dynamics occurring during special-operations missions. In addition, doctrine and training programs do not have an empirically based definition or conceptualization of culture (DoD JP 3-07 1995; DoD JP 2-01.3 2000; DoD JP 3.0 2001; DoD JP 5-00.1 2002; DoD JP 3-07.1 2004;).



In order to develop ideals, definitions, and a specific operational and tactical framework for analyzing culture and society during pre-deployment training, warfighters need to know what is available and what is lacking. This means the military needs to have an empirical foundation upon which to analyze the decisions, actions, outcomes, and consequences that would impact mission accomplishment.

### C. LEVELS OF TRAINING

Army Lieutenant Colonel William D. Wunderle, author of a cultural awareness primer for U.S. armed forces, designed the model shown in Figure 2 below. This pyramid shows how basic information gained at the lowest level augmented with specific and advanced training will lead to the cultural competence needed by decision makers at the highest level.




Figure 2. Cultural Awareness Pyramid

Wunderle's explanation of the levels is as follows:

- Cultural consideration ("how and why") is the incorporation of generic cultural concepts into common military training—knowing how and why to study culture and where to find cultural factors and expertise.
- Cultural knowledge (specific training) is exposure to the recent history of a target culture. It includes basic cultural issues such as significant groups, actors, leaders, and dynamics, as well as cultural niceties and survival language skills.
- Cultural understanding (advanced training) refers to a deeper awareness of the specific culture that allows general insight into thought processes, motivating factors, and other issues that directly support the military decision making process.
- Cultural competence (decision making and cultural intelligence) is the fusion of cultural understanding with cultural intelligence that allows focused insight into military planning and decision making for current and future military operations. Cultural competence implies insight into the intentions of specific actors and groups.

#### **D. SUMMARY**

Discussed in this chapter were weaknesses in training identified through literature as well as testimonies from warfighters. In general there is no standard across services as to what is involved and what level of training should be required for pre-deployment personnel. It was determined that the standard should include more than just identifying taboos on any level. Further, the use of modeling and simulation is the most agile approach to reaching the large audience for this type of training. In the next chapter interviewees discuss their experiences, giving more insight into training requirements, scenarios and attributes that assist with defining culture.

## **IV. INTERVIEW FINDINGS**

### **A INTRODUCTION**

Categorized excerpts from warfighters, a leader in a Christian NGO and a Iraqi born American Professor follows. All of these statements support and are directly linked to the attributes that are suggested in this thesis. to best capture the uniqueness of a particular group, which identifies their culture. Those attributes are *trust, collectiveness, individualism, religion, masculinity index, power distance index, social ties, and uncertainty avoidance.*

### **B. ANY SITUATIONS OF POSITIVE COOPERATIVE ENGAGEMENTS**

A study of cooperative engagement does several things. First, it easily lays out the who, what, when, and how a goal was accomplished. Second it serves as a script of what service members will probably face again under certain conditions which is also true of subsections in the rest of this chapter. Lastly, directly or indirectly, interactions reflect to some degree how and why the person belonging to a group behaves. The quotes in this section key on the whys of trust, collectivism and power distance.

The SS describes a conversation between her and the CNGOL: CNGOL says the IDF has been giving her organization a lot of help with security and tips on how to work successfully in the Palestine regions. CNGOL says that she follows their instructions and they support her ministry because they have seen increasing peace and stability there in Jericho. The IDF liaison said that hers is the only outside humanitarian organization that seems to be successful at building positive relationships with the Palestinians. (SS)

CNGOL: talks freely about Jesus (Yeshua) among Jews and Arabs, but she says that she never criticizes Muhammad or the Koran. She does not insist that her congregations call themselves Christians; rather most members of her church call themselves "Muslims who love Jesus."

The SS describes a conversation between her and the CNGOL: “She has also learned that in every community, she must first contact the political leader (often Hamas, sometimes another sheik) and explain that her ministry would like to work under his authority to help the people. She asks him to recommend ten families to help. She then provides aide for the families that are chosen by the sheik. CNGOL: ‘I take of his business so I can get on with my business of helping the poor.’ SS: ‘This approach, combining respect for the leader with the giving of material gifts for whomsoever he chooses, opens the door to the area.’

SS describes how CNGOL has gained respect as an outsider: “She intentionally contacts the mayor, sheik, or leading imam to ask him to choose ten families to help. She works with people from the camps and from the main city, providing donations to both groups—this gains her favor among both groups. Further, she makes no political statements, and she treats members of terrorist groups with respect. Although she works with IDF, she respectfully refuses to “spy for them,” but she will tell them when she sees anything dangerous. She does not identify specific members of political factions. Finally, she combines her fundraising with tourism by inviting foreigners to come and see Jericho. She is always bringing tourists here on a regular basis, which pleases the businessmen who are not in need of her donations.”

They pumped a lot of money into the community. We were able to drink tea and negotiated with local merchants to buy all sorts of things like movies, workout equipment, TVs and softball sets. There would be vendors that sometimes would come in and cook for us and that generated economic growth and they got a chance to earn a living. It also gave us a chance to see how they negotiated, it was definitely different from how we do business, no stress, and no timelines. (Marine).

### **C. TYPES OF INTERACTIONS EXPERIENCED**

This section provides a small introduction into the types of interactions the warfighters experienced.

...talking to various contractors that could offer services to the U.S. Army or local government. What type of contractors? Food services, waste-disposal services, construction service, vendor service for material and equipments. (Army Armor)

In Kosovo, I was in charge of town and provided security for the people there. First time in Iraq, I was part of the Third Corps headquarters, so I really did not interact with any of the locals with the exception of very few contractors. The second time I was in Iraq I was a cavalry-troop commander, so I interacted with people a lot. We were responsible for areas of operations and I was like the governor of the towns. They had neighborhood area councils NACs and district area councils DACs for Baghdad. I would go to there to have meetings. There was a bunch of representatives and sheiks there and I would have to listen to their complaints and try to channel civil relief funding to places that needed it. (Army)

They were service workers on our base. (Marine)

#### **D. CULTURAL DIFFERENCES EXPERIENCED**

This section illustrates the cultural differences between the American service member and Iraqi member. Power Distance Index distance is the key attribute of this section.

Because the Middle Easterners are very big on your word, if you violate your word then, in their eyes, even though you did not intentionally do it, you've still violated your word and broken that bond of trust in that relationship. It is very hard to rebuild that, regain that trust. So the platoon leaders and whoever is interfacing with these local leaders have to build relationships first, which is good for both sides, then you get the community leader's trust, then the local leaders are more willing to accept your presence and more willing to accept what you are trying to do. It is that whole buy-in thing; they're buying into what you are trying to get them to do. (Army Armor).

We have to be very careful in the Middle East. If we say something is going to get done, they expect it to get done. Now, as Americans and in our language we may put it on as "hey, I'm going to try and get this done for you, for us we know that "try to get" may or may not happen. In the Middle East though, that can be interpreted as "hey these guys are going to do this for us or help us do it", and if that does not pan out it immediately erodes any kind of relationship of trust that you built. (Army Armor).

What is interesting is that I was talking to that guy I mentioned earlier, and we were talking about the American way, birthday

cards, Christmas, and the holidays, and how we indirectly impose that on the rest of the world, and it is going to be difficult to do reconstruction when they don't believe in what we believe and the way we live our lives. (Marine)

#### **E. ANY SOCIAL TIES OR SEPARATORS EXPERIENCED**

In this section uncertainty avoidance and trust are the primary attributes. Again in each quote there are possible training objectives and role playing or story line scenarios that may be useful in computer based training.

I saw the people that worked together, hangout together most. I was with a mix of guys from Syria, Jordan and Iraq and they all kind of hung out together, I guess if they were forced to work together they would hang out together. (Marine).

One of the guys said specifically that if you were somewhat friendly toward the U.S. they feared being killed. They said if they left Ahlizad where I was, they would be killed immediately, because they would assume to be getting paid by the U.S. to work. (Marine).

What is interesting is that I was talking to that guy I mention earlier and we were talking about the American way, birthday cards, Christmas, and the holidays and how we indirectly impose that on the rest of the world and it is going to be difficult to do reconstruction when they don't believe in what we believe and the way we live our lives. (Marine).

#### **F. ACTIONS THAT INDUCED AND REDUCE CONFLICT**

The quotes that follow highlight some taboos but more importantly they identify attributes such as collectivism vs. individualism, power distance, social ties, and uncertainty avoidance and trust.

We created new problems by trying to hire locals as interpreters. They needed armor and protection, if they helped us then their families also needed protection, and some of those guys worked for the insurgents and so it was difficult. (Army Armor).

We would do various things. We would go out into the local community get trash and waste off the streets and find people that

could provide the equipment to get rid of trash and waste, like dump trucks for example. And to find people who are willing to work. So you had to talk to people to move it and to people who were willing to pick it up. (Army Armor).

The Iqari police and Army have to be the strategic objective. What we saw is that they were really not getting the pay, equipment, and training they needed to actually be able to provide security. We had to interface with the paymasters to get them paid. They were not getting paid. They had major infrastructure problems; I don't believe that the higher-ups concerned themselves with making the Iraqi army the strategic objective. (Army Armor).

Number one was security (definitely), you couldn't really do any relief without a secure environment. (Armor Calvary).

Reducing the violence, providing security, and rebuilding critical infrastructure (railroads, electricity, sewers). (Navy IP 1)

They pumped and lot of money into the community. (Marine).

So once you have built those relationships and when you actually get those resources and are able to come back and assist the community in doing whatever you'd like to help them with, then that just increased that bond of trust between the military and the local population. Then they begin to see our presence is not just merely an occupier but one that is truly trying to assist. (Army Armor)

We built--I won't say we rebuilt--we helped rebuild a hospital in Talaphar that had been controlled by the insurgents. We then resupplied the hospital with all the things they needed to provide healthcare to their citizens. We also did the same things with schools, roads, sidewalks. With the schools, we even wrote to our families to send school supplies to supplement what the Iraqi government could not provide. We did a lot of stuff like that. Water had to be trucked into the town at various points and food distribution points. We had the Iraqi Army and police handing that stuff out to help mend and build a relationship there." (Army Armor).

In general they were pretty normal and they would look at you individually, I think. They had a bad impression of the military at first, but then they would meet us and got to know us and realized we were just like them and that we had families and liked them and

we liked the same kind of music. I think their opinion was just like others around the world, with the U.S being the biggest and baddest on the block and everyone has a negative opinion about us.” (Army Armor).

CNGOL: Israeli Muslims would ask “Why are you doing this (referring back to her giving out clothes, food, medical supplies, etc.)? She replies “because we love the Palestinian or Arabic or Muslim people” (depending on which group was present). The reply back was “but I thought that Christians hated us!

## **G. UNDERSTANDING THE POWER AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE**

Found in this section are quotes that key in on power distance index, masculinity, and uncertainty avoidance.

They almost have a kind of chain of command. But what you start getting outside of the single family unit with the fathers and start getting a bit higher into the hierarchy: there is the tribal elders (the elders are influential), then you are going to have your local imams, then your local sheiks, the neighborhood is going to have a sheik, but all will have an imam. The imams are going to be the most respected leader in a tribe. The mayors are not really influential, but the imams are the most influential. (Army Armor).

So in effect what that did was it raised the legitimacy of the local leader, community leader. It created jobs, put money in the community for people to earn a living legitimated through legal means and performed as a vital community service. So that they had a clean, safe, functioning community to live in. (Army Armor).

## **H. PRE-DEPLOYMENT TRAINING RECEIVED**

This section and the next point out that language, religion, and knowledge of family structure were absent from training but were required skills on the battle field. This section further illustrates the point that the Department of Defense must take a serious approach to standardizing cultural training.

During the first deployment there was no training. For OIF3, the training was centered around what I would call Iraqi experts. The classes were set up where he brought in Middle Eastern experts



that taught like a seminar-type fashion, like college-credit-type classes with so many hours of classroom lecture. We learned about history, Iraqi customs, taboos, and things like that. We learned about money, how the culture in Iraq interoperated with each other, and it was very watered down but it was better than nothing. (Army Armor).

It was like a thirty-minute slide presentation, it was so ridiculous. Don't point and don't show them the bottom of your feet. (Marine).

I received cultural awareness training for approximately two to three hours total (left hand is dirty hand, accept food or drink when offered, etc).”(Navy IP Recent)

## **I. ANY SUGGESTED TRAINING FOR FUTURE WARFIGHTERS**

BILAD training where from the battalion level you would go out and task a unit to find whoever the imam was, meet these people so that you could start having discussions and building a relationship process. (Army Armor)

Being able to speak the language. Maybe some short, brief, simple questions that we can ask them. The Americans would ask them a question and then speak slower and the guy still did not understand because we did not speak their language. So some language training would be nice. (Marine)

Knowing the customs and beliefs of the Iraq people. Knowing their religious beliefs. Typical we just do not know the customs and beliefs. It was difficult because they didn't get the training before deploying to Iraq. So having something emplaced during training cycle would help. (IP 2)

## **J. ATTRIBUTE MODEL**

As discussed, the purpose of this research is to better the warfighter's ability to operate with success in an SSTR environment. To do this the warfighter needs training, more specifically pre-deployment indigenous culture training. The researcher is in agreement with two of the interviewees in that the best training would be to role play with real, indigenous people in this case Iraqis.

The next best thing would be for that entire role play to be captured in a game based trainer, allowing the user (the war fighter) to become interactive with the system at his or his computer. In order for this interaction to even closely resemble real human behavior the avatars must behave like the people they represent. It is suggested in this research that the attributes shown in Figure 3 be the baseline standard for those representation. I suggest that the nine identifiers be scaled appropriately to the corresponding society, in similar fashion to the work of Dr. Geert Hofstede. Realizing that no model will exactly replicate the behavior of the human, the attributes suggested here will facilitate fidelity to train the warfighter at the “knowledge level” or higher quite easily. The Professor of Middle Eastern studies during his interview suggested that “tradition be added” to the model. I argue that tradition is a result of the prescribed attributes converging over time.




Figure 3. Researcher's Attribute Design Concept

## K. SUMMARY

In each of the above categories (Positive Cooperative Engagement PCE, Social Ties or Separators, etc.) most if not all social cultural attributes described in the Social Science section of this document were reiterated by the interviewee's answers. In the category of PCE, the people of Jericho *trusted* the CNGOL's commitment to helping their friends and neighbors. Another example is the Arabic converts to Christianity in Jericho who called themselves "Muslims who loved Jesus"; *religion* and *normative social* behavior constrained their behavior. Masculinity Index and other attributes are captured in several statements pertaining to the U.S. Military and NGOs negotiating to rebuild local infrastructure.

The categories used in this section are easily transferred to learning objectives for all areas of cultural awareness training. The researcher also suggested that within the cultural simulation each category as a minimum be used as a storybook theme for training.

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## **V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE WORK**

### **A. CONCLUSIONS**

From the researcher's personal experience, the discussion of modeling and simulation of any event in the real world always raises the question: What will be the level of fidelity of this model? The difficulty here, unlike things that are more concrete or physics based is that humans are unpredictable. There is no biopsy or experiment that can with any degree of accuracy explain scientifically why or predict how a particular human will behave. However, as those humans form groups and those groups form behavioral patterns, over time those patterns give way to identifying features of that particular group. Those patterns become the group's culture.

This research suggests that there are certain cultural social attributes that differentiate one group from another such as: Trust, Collectivism, Individualism, Religion, Masculinity Index, Power Distance Index, Social Ties, and Uncertainty Avoidance. The separation is not in any way to imply that one culture or group is better than any other. The purpose of this research is to equip the military person and war planner with the skills to understand culture and social behaviors of a population. This research insists that a game based trainer is an efficient tool for training service member before they are deployed into new cultural environments. As per the literature review on training and supported by the accounts of the warfighters the standards or joint service standards of how and what is trained in cultural awareness are absent. The research here suggests that language, history, culture, taboos, negotiating, traditions, religion, and social structure be the minimum for a as Wunderle's research calls it, a "knowledge level" understanding.

The responsibility of a trainer is to expose the trainee to every possible scenario in practice so that he or she has the baseline knowledge to make the

best operational decision. The post-war operational training is no less important than pre-war operational training. Technological advances with computers, computer based training and game based training, surely makes representing human social, cultural behaviors much easier than they have been in the past.

## **B. FUTURE WORK**

What follows are possibilities that were not accomplished during this period of research. It is suggested that these opportunities be researched and explored.

- Prototyping agents/avatars that exhibit some of the attributes defined within
- Further define joint training requirements concerning culture
- Compare NATO nation's cultural training programs
- Compare Non-Governmental organizations training programs
- Prepare a metric for all societies base on attributes listed within
- Explore the connection between culture and DIME
- Explore the connection between culture and PMESII
- Examine culture and insurgent activities

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## APPENDIX A

### Army Armor

I'd like to begin by asking you questions that allow me to understand more about your background.

1. **What branch of service are you in?** Army
2. **How long have you been in the military?** 18 years
3. **What occupational community do you belong to in your branch of service?** Armor
4. **What is your age?** 37
5. **What countries have you been deployed to?**  
Iraq and Kuwait
6. **How many times were you deployed to the Middle East?**  
Kuwait (1) Iraq (2)
7. **How long were your deployments?**  
Iraq (12months) and Kuwait (3 months)
8. **Did you interact with the local population?**  
Minimum. Yes
9. **How did you interact with the local population?**  
Talking to various contractors that could offer services to the U.S. Army or local government. What type of contractors? Food services, waste-disposal services, construction service, vendor service for material and equipments.
10. **What issues do you believe are the most important for individual and community growth in the country you were deployed in?**  
As far as individual growth, economics gives you jobs, number one. Community growth, it would have to be electricity, waste disposal, and

sewage. Infrastructure-type things that enable people to operate normally so that they can have things like business. Electricity to run their business to increase employment. Have more job opportunity.

**11. What could you do as a solidier to improve those things that you felt were important?**

We would do various things. We would go out into the local community get trash and waste off the streets and find people that could provide the equipment to get rid of trash and waste, like dump trucks for example. And find people who are willing to work. So you had to talk to people to move it and to people who were willing to pick it up. You would a tribal sheik or community leader with a specific neighborhood and you would engage that person to find the people who could move the trash and the people who were willing to pick up the trash. And let the sheik decide on who's going to do what work. Because this is his neighborhood and community leader, we would pay out of the sheik to hand out wages. This increased his legitimacy, or if you could not find that community leader, which was rare, gave each individual a salary for their work performed. Best answer was to find that community leader and have everything run through that community leader. Because that kept you from having to oversee how many employees and having to go out and spot-check every employee to make sure that they were working. You would give it the money to the sheik. Let him organize it. Let him supervise it. Let him pay out the salaries and then we routinely come and make sure that what we are paying for is actually being completed. This was pretty easy. You could see trash going away. You see the street less littered and the rebuilding of schools. Schools were big projects in neighborhoods. Typically, you would do the same concept, you would go to a local community leader who was leader where the school was. Go in and tour the school, talk to the teachers on what the school needed. As far as electricity work, plumbing work, or whatever the case may be. Painting whatever the case may be. You would go to the local community leader and tell him what the teachers wanted. You would typically try to do this with a community leader. Come to an agreement on what needs to be done and you would ask the sheik to find those people that had the access and equipment to do that job or all those little jobs that need to be done with that school; have the sheik hire, them pay the sheik, and the sheik pays the salaries. Then we would spot-check the schools and make sure, and talk to the teachers and make sure what we asked to be done was actually being completed. And it's pretty easy to see the lights didn't turn on the first time you went and now lights turn on. You know the school didn't have glass in the windows when you went there for the inspection, and now there is glass in the windows. So it's pretty easy to spot check and make sure that the work you were paying for is actually being performed. So in affect, what that did was it raised the legitimacy of the local leader, community leader. It created jobs, put money

in the community for people to earn a living, legitimated through legal means and performed as a vital community service. So that they had a clean, safe, functioning community to live in.

**12. What level of negotiating were you doing that on, as a platoon leader or division?**

No, this was the lowest level possible. Typical how this would work is you would have a platoon leader in charge of a specific neighborhood. A platoon leader would be an lieutenant in the Army, 01 or 02. He would be in charge of a neighborhood within his company's area of responsibilities. He was the one who primarily engaged the local populace. He would find out what their grievances were and issues were and he would elevate those grievance and issues up the chain of command. Through his company commander up through the platoon commander. We continue to go up. So in that time the operation priority was maybe stability and reconstruction at that time. After those issues and concerns have been elevated, those solutions would eventually trickle back down the chain of command. You know your higher-level chain of command says at whatever level you can have this amount of money to do whatever projects you deem is priority within your area of responsibility. And that would get filtered to the next levels of chain of command where they could apply other resources to help. It may be government equipment, eg, bulldozers and you don't have enough money to go pay for what you are being budgeted, but you could pull in from the Army or civilian contractors as for as KBR, if that was a possible solution; and you would trickle down money and resources to get pull until it got to the battalion level and they would look at how much resources they have and how much money they have and priorities all of the projects that needed to be completed based off the resources they could manage and do it with, and then those monies and resources would eventually end up back in the hands of that platoon leader to go back and do negotiations with that local community leader to get those projects completed. So its kind of a bureaucratic process, it takes a little time, normally projects were constantly ongoing, so nothing was stagnant and you did not have periods where nothing was happening, you always had things happening, but you had to be very aggressive on identifying priorities, elevating priorities up through the chain of command, be very aggressive on receiving the funding and resources that you needed the get into the hands of the local populace to do the work. Then there was oversight, starting with that platoon leader and his men making sure the job was getting done. Then you had persons that were involved with this, the civil-military-operations personnel, who, when a platoon leader said this school needs this or trash needed picking up or what ever the case maybe, the CMO guys would help organize that for the battalion, by going out with those platoon leaders or those company commanders to actually see it for themselves. So they were

involved in this total process, kind of like the quality-control check, prioritizing for his guys which one was the most important and the least important. The platoon leader helps oversee this, by doing his inspections, making sure the work was getting done; and the company commander also did that with the platoon leader, and the CMO guys would also come out and routinely inspect. It was like a layered process of checks, balances, and controls. To make sure that rebuilding and reconstruction was happening to help community growth, get businesses going, to offer people a legitimate means of making money, so it's kind of how that process works.

**11. What culture issues came about from negotiating with the community leader?**

Speaking on Iraq of course, Middle East, the culture part is really tricky. You've heard that first there has to be a relationship built, the cultural part is very tricky. As a new platoon leader you can't give the impression that "Hey, I want to know your issues" and we're going to commit to things like we're going to rebuild that school. Cause a platoon leader doesn't know if he's going to be given the money and resources to actually do that. And really it is out of his hands and all he can do is really elevate what needs to be done. He doesn't know when he is doing this relationship building with the local community leader—after he has found out who the local community leader is, which can be tricky—he can't give this impression that things are going to be done. What I mean by perception is we have to be very careful in the Middle East if we say something is going to get done they expect it to get done. Now, as Americans and in our language we may put it on as "hey, I'm going to try and get this done for you, for us we know that "try to get" may or may not happen. In the Middle East though, that can be interpreted as "hey these guys are going to do this for us or help us do it" and if that does not pan out it immediately erodes any kind of relationship of trust that you built. Because the Middle Easterners are very big on your word and so if you violate your word, then, in their eyes, even though you did not intentionally do it, you've still violated your word and broken that bond of trust in that relationship. It is very hard to rebuild that, regain that trust. So the platoon leaders and whoever is interfacing with these local leaders have to build relationships first, which is good for both sides. Then you get the community leader's trust, then the local leaders are more willing to accept your presence and more willing to accept what you are trying to do. It is that whole buy-in thing; they're buying into what you are trying to get them to do. At the same time, that relationship is good for us because we began to understand who we should deal with and who we should we not deal with. You have got to weed out on which local community leader is concerned about his local community and wants to help them, or which local leader is corrupt. So there has to be that relationship building on both sides. It is tough for us because we just want

to say “hey we want to help you rebuild this school, let’s get to work.” And then you find out that all that money and resources you just handed out went into someone’s pockets for their own means and not what it was intended for. So once you have built those relationships and when you actually get those resources and are able to come back and assist the community in doing whatever you’d like to help them with, then that just increased that bond of trust between the military and the local population. Then they begin to see our presence is not just merely an occupier but one that is truly trying to assist, does that make sense?

**12. Who are the most influential groups in a typical social network?**

They almost have a kind of chain of command. But when you start getting outside of the single family unit with the fathers and start getting a bit higher into the hierarchy, there is the tribal elders (the elders are influential), then you are going to have your local imams, then your local sheiks, the neighborhood is going to have a sheik, but all will have an imam. The imams are going to be the most respected leader in a tribe. The mayors are not really influential, but the imams are the most influential.

**13. In places where outside forces, such as the United Nations or American military, are active, what opportunities and challenges does this present for people in the community?**

The view ran on both spectrums of the plot. There were those that hated Americans and would never accept the American presence. There were people that I would not say loved Americans but they saw Americans as buffers, they did not trust their local police and army and were a little more able to embrace you.

**15. Following a change in government, what factors most likely lead some people to support development of their businesses and society, and what factors lead others to oppose development?**

I was there during two elections, the national constitution and reformation that brought in Maliki. From my own slice of the pie in Telaphar, a small primary election was not successful. There were only three voting booths and they were all placed in the Shia neighborhoods in Telaphar. At that time the Shia neighborhoods were the only somewhat safe neighborhoods. Americans wanted to put an Iraqi face on everything, so we are not going to secure a voting site ourselves we are going to have Iraqi to do that, Iraqi army, Iraqi police and Iraqi citizens to operate those booths. So there were not many other sect members that were not going to go to the Shia neighborhood to vote, so turn out was minimum, very minimum.

Conversely, during the election of the constitutional referendum and then the national-election referendum, we were able to establish a dozen voting booths inside the town of Telaphar and they were in all neighborhoods of town. There were no attacks on those voting booths during the national referendum, as a matter of fact, there were no attacks our town whatsoever during the elections. But it took a very aggressive plan and very aggressive patrolling on our part and on the Iraqi army's to make that happen, and then putting the Iraqi police to protect those different voting booths. How you did it was Sunnis securing and working the Sunni booths and Shia securing and working booths in their area and I think that there was twenty times as many voters than the previous election. There were attacks during the national elections, but none were directly on the voting booths, they were indirect fires and mortars. Some people were killed, women, and children.

**16. What did the U.S. military do to make life better in country X or other Middle Eastern nations?**

We built, I won't say we rebuilt, we help rebuild a hospital in Telaphar that had been controlled by the insurgents. We then resupplied the hospital with all the things they needed to provide healthcare to their citizens. We also did the same things with schools, roads, sidewalks. With the schools, we even wrote to our families to send school supplies to supplement what the Iraqi government could not provide. We did a lot of stuff like that. Water had to be trucked into the town at various points and food distribution points. We had the Iraqi army and police handing that stuff out to help mend and build a relationship there.

**17. What did the U.S. military do to make life more difficult in country x or other Middle Eastern nations?**

Inside the town of Telaphar we put up concrete barriers to control the flow of traffic. We forced traffic to flow through checkpoints and it was inconvenient but they knew we were making it safe, but it was constant bargaining of "does this barrier need to be there." We also put up a berm completely around the town, which was completely surrounded by desert. We built an eight-foot berm around the town. The farmers who transported their goods were inconveniences because they had to circle around to enter in one of the two routes. It was the only way to secure the city and make it safe and prevented infiltrations. We also occupied the granary, which was the largest job market during harvest season and houses where we paid rent and other parts of town that I'm sure they were not happy with.



**18. What training did you receive before deployment that prepared you for interactions with other cultures?**

During the first deployment there was no training. For OIF3 the training was centered around what I would call Iraqi experts. The classes were set up where he brought in Middle Eastern experts that taught like a seminar type fashion, like college-credit-type classes with so many hours of classroom lecture. We learned about history, Iraqi customs, taboos, and things like that. We learned about money, how the culture in Iraq interoperated with each other, and it was very watered down but it was better than nothing. My regimental commander understood that language was a barrier, a major obstacle, and you don't have enough interpreters. We created new problems by trying to hire locals as interpreters. They needed armor and protection if they helped us; then their families also needed protection, and some of those guys worked for the insurgents, and so it was difficult. So the commander called the colleges in Colorado and asked the school to start offering classes and they did in intro Arabic, Islamic customs, Middle Eastern history and they did. And he got the Army to allow those soldiers to attend the schools for college credits and for the Army to then send those troops out to train the companies of soldiers and the officers got a booklist of must-reads and you could tell the difference, from the first time until the last time. Another example is the "F" word which is an adjective, noun, or verb or however you want to use it, and us as Americans hear it and don't get offended by it but... in Iraq it is one of the most insulting words you could ever use. They were totally offended by it. The word was outlawed in my unit and it was one of those things that came out of those classes and seminars and it was anything that we could figure out to better our image to make our soldiers understand how we were hurting ourselves and to not repeat the mistakes we made the first time we were there.

**19. What training do you think would have made you more prepared for cooperative engagements with the local culture?**

"BILAD" training where from the battalion level you would go out and task a unit to find whoever the imam was, meet these people so that you could start having discussions and building a relationship process. Learning that you have to interact with the locals and that you just can't ride around, not interact, and find out what the issues are. You are not going to get people to stop shooting at you if you do not get your message out to them and the only way you do that is to talk to the people. Before I left for OIF3 there was minimum BILAD training where they had Americans playing the roll of a sheik. We don't know how their thought process is or what their culture is playing the roll of the sheik but we got some do's and don'ts. However, that's it. It was tough when you got an interpreter and he's the only one

that speaks English so you are looking at the interpreter and and talking to the interpreter and you are at the same time are disrespecting the other guy because you are not looking at him.

Before coming to NPS, my unit was getting ready to go back to Iraq. What we did was brought in, not just Iraqis, but natural-born citizens were paid to play those roles in training so now you are really talking to an elder Middle Eastern man or woman and also your interpreter was one of those real Iraqis, contracted civilians, so now you are really talking to people that really understand the culture and there is a room full of them like when you are really going to do a BILAD. The Iraqis really don't see privacy in a conversation. If you are talking to some, everyone is going to get involved, unless you pull that person aside into an area that you control, if you wanted them to or not. And they are very animated shouting with their language and waving their hands, and for them that's just natural discourse. They can then tell if they were intimidating you and that makes them more upset because they were not trying to intimidate you. The contractors acted the same way. The training BILADs became a training team, the trainings were recorded, and afterwards we would go back and review what we did wrong and what we did right and I think it was a great improvement. I wanted to go back though when my company went this time to see how much of a difference I would be in engaging the local populace, it was very good.

20. **Are there any further issues or situations about regional stability, reconstruction and partnering with the U.S. military that you would like to discuss?**

The Iraqi police and Army have to be the strategic objective. What we saw is that they were really not getting the pay, equipment, and training they needed to actually be able to provide security. We had to interface with the paymasters to get them paid. They were not getting paid. They had major infrastructure problems; I don't believe that the higher-ups concerned themselves with making the Iraqi army the strategic objective.

## APPENDIX B

### Army Cavalry

1. **What branch of service are you in?** Army
2. **How long have you been in the military?** ten years
3. **What occupational community do you belong to in your branch of service?** Armor and cavalry
4. **What is your age?** 32
5. **What countries were you been deployed to?**  
Kosovo, Iraq (twice)
6. **How many Middle Eastern deployments have you served?**  
Kosovo (six months) Iraq (nine and thirteen months)
7. **How long were your deployments to the Middle East?**  
Kosovo (six months), Iraq (nine and thirteen months)
8. **Did you interact with the local population?** Yes
9. **How did you interact with the local population?**  

In Kosovo, I was in charge of town and provided security for the people there. First time In Iraq, I was part of the Third Corps headquarters, so I really did not interact with any of the locals with the exception of very few contractors. The second time I was in Iraq I was a cavalry-troop commander, so I interacted with people a lot. We were responsible for areas of operations and I was like the governor of the towns. They had neighborhood area councils NACs and district area councils DACs for Baghdad. I would go to there to have meetings. There was a bunch of representatives and sheiks there and I would have to listen to their complaints and try to channel civil relief funding to places that needed it.
10. **What issues do you believe are the most important for individual and community growth in the country you were deployed in Iraq?**  

Number one was security (definitely), you couldn't really do any relief with out a secure environment. Security wouldn't be a hundred percent but

security was the huge issue, but it was in Kosovo, too, even though the threat was less there to the people. Their number one emotional issue was security. And the other thing that the sects or other ethnic groups were perceived to cause: trash, trash was everywhere, a nonfunctioning trash system was a disaster. Sewage, water, healthcare, and fuel, fuel was a big one. There were riots in Baghdad over fuel, due to the perceived corruption of the leaders. Corruption was big issue although corruption was usually seen by one side as present in the other side, when it usually was not the case.

**11. Could you help me understand how people in Turkey/Iraq/Saudi Arabia choose their friends and partners?**

Number one was their family affiliation, everybody is related somehow. They have a saying, "it's me against my brother, it's me and my brother against my cousins, it's me and my cousins against outsiders, and then it's all Iraqis against the world." So it goes back to the family being the center, or clan, if you call it that, and there is a hierarchy. There is generally one guy, a sheik running around with the real power in the system and not the government. Outside the family, it was primarily sectarian. Names were a big thing, for example, if your name was Omar then you were most likely Sunni and if a Shia stopped, you and you had an ID on you it was mostly likely a bad thing, cause names tended to name what sects you are.

**12. Who are the most influential groups in a typical social network?**

The sheiks, the heads of families or their lieutenants were the most influential groups. Also the imams of mosques, which is a double-edged sword, because every Friday they blast their sermons on the radio or loud speakers; which is usually about some anti-American sentiment. However, they are kind of stuck into doing that because if they said let's all have peace and love the Americans, they won't be imams any longer, they'd probably be killed.

**13. In places where outside forces, such as the United Nations or American military, are active, what opportunities and challenges does this present for people in the community?**

When I was there, we had a policy of staying on the forward operating bases, which has since changed since I was there. Which I think, was a good move. You have to interact with the people. One thing is that we provide jobs for the people when we have projects, need trash picked up, and other things, then we will get some contractor to do it. Once we have gotten a contractor and he wants to bring workers from outside the area,

this can be problematic and especially if they are from a different sect. The rumor mill is huge in Iraq. The locals will come to an American to see what we think of the rumor.

**13b. What kind of rumors?**

For instance with the gas, the Baghdad government was trying to distribute gas to the people. We arrived at a gas station where the people were upset and complaining. The government had planned to ration out the gas and distribute it from house to house, but for some reason changed and decided to give it out at gas stations around Baghdad. However, that particular station was temporarily out of gas and the Iraqis believed that the officials were not giving them gas because they were keeping it for themselves to sell on the black market (which could have been true). They will definitely see things through a colored lens.

They would say that people were collaborating with the Americans just to shed negative light on them; and once someone thought that you were with the Americans, it could be bad for you. For example, there was a rule in Iraq that if you had a governmental body, you must have a female on it, which is contrary to how they really work. She had a son that was having seizures. We gave her some Tylenol for him because that was all that we could do for them and when that news got around, she was killed. She had not done anything and for us, other than showing up at the meetings and talking to us. Even being part of the process of making things better for people can be a bad thing.

The social networks were fast. Several times, we did cordon searches of neighborhoods and the people were all standing outside waiting for us so that they could open their doors to let us in. They all knew we were coming, even though we tried to keep operational security as much as possible. Nevertheless, they all have cell phones and they are much better networked than we are, even with our hundreds of thousands of dollars of high-tech trucks and equipment. They have cell phones, sending pictures to people, and giving instant battle-damage assessment BDA to people seconds after a suicide bomber blows up. So, at least when I was there, we were slow to combat that.

**13c. Other than jobs, were there other opportunities?**

It is hard to define what opportunity is over there. Everyone was trying to make a buck, to make a living out there. There were people who wanted to make things better, but they were hampered with the security situation over there. It was hard with the security situation. We did not live in Iraq,

they did. There were many people that wanted to help and do good things, I think. But they wouldn't do so if it put them at risk, which goes back to security being a big thing.

14. **Could you tell how the local people from the country you were deployed to form opinions about whether certain military actions are good or bad?**

If it benefited them or their group, it was good. If it harmed them or their group or affected their clan negatively, it was bad. It was all perception. Therefore, from our point of view, we are running around trying to capturing terrorists and that's always good. But it really depends on the people you are talking to and what they're going to get out of it.

15. **Following a change in government, what factors most likely lead some people to support development of their businesses and society, and what factors lead others to oppose development?**

I think that it is tied to the position they had in society before the change of government. People that were rich businessmen before tried to hold on to their business. The Sunnis were the whole infrastructure before the fall of Saddam, they were the ones in charge of all the factories and stuff, and that led them to trying to keep that place in society, which was falling because they were under pressure from the Shias. I think the Shias were trying to figure it all out, because they really did not start out as management as a whole. I think the Shia for instance, the Jahaas Almighty, they loved to find places where our relief efforts, our civil support, our services were pretty low and there were a lot of poor Shia. They would go in and set up generators and run power to everybody, set up ad-hoc street lights, and they were showing that hey, we can provide something that the Americans could not or the government could not. They were using that as a way to gain status and to show that they were the de-facto government, instead of us ineffective Americans. They developed a separate network infrastructure and whoever the sheik was that could provide those services, his star rose, I guess.

16. **What did the U.S. military do to make life better in country X or other Middle Eastern nations?**

Trash, civil services, medical clinics, handed out meals, and goodwill stuff like throwing soccer balls to the kids. The big stuff was fixing infrastructure so things would work. In the poorer parts of Baghdad, the infrastructure was pretty bad and there was sewage, giant puddles of sewage and garbage, up to your knees everywhere and we tried to get stuff going with that. Again, it was a security issue, because if you wanted garbage-truck drivers to go around and pick up the garbage, they cannot really do that

unless they're secure. As soon as you leave, somebody would come around and kill them or scare them off and they would not come back to work. In the Sunni areas, it was as if people would say we are Jahaas Almighty, and we are providing the services not you. So security was always an issue. We had great security when we were there because we have tanks, Bradleys, machine guns, and airpower, but when you leave it's hard to control these things.

**17. What did the U.S. military do to make life more difficult in country X or other Middle Eastern nations?**

We supported security measures that made things difficult for people. We blocked roads, so there was not a giant network of roads into Baghdad. We tried to channelize movement on the major routes and we had checkpoints along those routes, this included the U.S., the National police, or the Iraqi Army. Checkpoints were good and bad, depending on who was running them. If you were of a different sect, the checkpoints may turn you away, be harder on you, or do things to you. Moreover, they were good because it helped stop the flow of unrestricted explosives and weapons into Baghdad, and that made things also difficult.

**18. What training did you receive before deployment that prepared you for interactions with other cultures?**

We did our own training exercises with our own soldiers playing surrogate, fake Iraqis, which was not that great. Then we did a short mission-rehearsal exercise, which half of which was focused on high-intensity combat because at the time people were thinking we had to be ready just in case Iran invaded or we invade Iran or something. It was only a short period. Rehearsing with a fake Iraqi was like dealing with a caricature of what a real Iraqi is, and in some ways it's not that helpful.

**18b. Have you had any cultural awareness training?**

We did some cultural awareness training, not as much as we should have, I think. When we first got into theater, they flew all the company commanders and above up to the Taji to the Counterinsurgency Academy, where we spent about a week learning counterinsurgency from some special-forces guys, which was great, but we should have had it a year earlier. Another thing was the unlearning the behaviors that were common since during the invasion. The way we acted during the invasions with the Iraqi was not the way we needed to act during the postwar time.

19. **What training do you think would have made you more prepared for cooperative engagements with the local culture?**

Arabic-languages training, classes in contracting and negotiations with locals, an understanding of what our piece in the puzzle was as a combat unit fitting into the big picture. We had many new soldiers and we were still training on the basic shooting marksmanship stuff, so it was hard trying to train up for the higher-level stuff.

20. **Are there any further issues or situations about regional stability, reconstruction and collaborating with the U.S. military that you would like to discuss?**

We had a lot of success, not in these terms— reconstruction and stuff— but in success in detaining anti-coalition people when doing combined operations with the Iraqis. Because they know about people, they have the expertise with dealing with their people and they can sense who's bad and not, and that helps immensely. They are not equipped for stability operations. Then there was the bigger question of, if it is the military's job to do all the reconstruction stuff, or should the State Department have a bigger role? I found that the Army tended to make stuff up for training and it would have been more helpful for a more combined effort.



## APPENDIX C

### MARINE

1. **What branch of service are you in?** U.S. Marine Corp
2. **How long have you been in the military?** Thirteen years
3. **What occupational community do you belong to in your branch of service?** KC 130 pilot
4. **What is your age?** 34
5. **What countries have you been deployed to?** Bahrain, Iraq
6. **How many times were you deployed to the Middle East?**  
Twice.
7. **How long were your deployments?**  
Bahrain (five months), and Iraq (five months).
8. **Did you interact with the local population?** Yes.
9. **How did you interact with the local population?**  
They were service workers on our base.
10. **What issues do you believe are the most important for individual and community growth in the country you were deployed in?**  
  
In Iraq, I think it was freedom to speak their minds and not having the government control every move they make and also fear from bodily harm from doing something different than the norm or the terrorist groups not want them to do.
11. **Could you help me understand how people in Turkey/Iraq/Saudi Arabia choose their friends and partners?**  
  
I think that it was more about the people they worked with. I saw the people that worked together, hang out together most. I was with a mix of guys from Syria, Jordan, and Iraq, and they all kind of hung out together. I guess if they were forced to work together, they would hang out together.

12. **Who are the most influential groups in a typical social network?**

From what I saw, it was their boss in a work environment. They all were kind of submissive to him.

13. **In places where outside forces, such as the United Nations or American military, are active, what opportunities and challenges does this present for people in the community?**

One of guys said specifically that if you were somewhat friendly toward the U.S., they feared being killed. They said if they left Ahlizad where I was, they would be killed immediately, because they would assume to be getting paid by the U.S. to work. During my deployment, the base started having a lot more mortar attacks and other people would be coming on base and the workers got to a point where it was not safe for them anymore, and they wound up leaving and not coming back to the base to work. I felt safe, but they feared for their safety.

14. **Could you tell how the local people from the country you were deployed to form opinions about whether certain military actions are good or bad?**

In general they were pretty normal and they would look at you individually, I think. They had a bad impression of the military at first but then they would meet us and got to know us and realized we were just like them, and that we had families and liked them and we liked the same kind of music. I think their opinion was just like others around the world, with the U.S. being the biggest and baddest on the block and everyone has a negative opinion about us.

15. **Following a change in government, what factors most likely lead some people to support development of their businesses and society, and what factors lead others to oppose development?**

I came home before the election period. I can't comment.

16. **What did the U.S. military do to make life better in country X or other Middle Eastern nations?**

They pumped a lot of money into the community. We were able to drink tea and negotiated with local merchants to buy all sorts of things like movies, workout equipment, TVs and softball sets. There would be vendors that sometimes would come in and cook for us and that generated economic growth and they got a chance to earn a living. It also

gave us a chance to see how they negotiated, it was definitely different from how we do business, no stress, and no timelines.

17. **What did the U.S. military do to make life more difficult in Iraq or other Middle Eastern nations?**

I don't think anything we did made it more difficult for those guys.

18. **What training did you receive before deployment that prepared you for interactions with other cultures?**

It was like a thirty-minute slide presentation, it was so ridiculous. It discussed things like "don't point and don't show them the bottom of your feet."

19. **What training do you think would have made you more prepared for cooperative engagements with the local culture?**

Being able to speak the language. Maybe some short, brief, simple questions that we can ask them. The Americans would ask them a question and then speak slower and the guy still did not understand because we did not speak their language. So some language training would be nice.

20. **Are there any further issues or situations about regional stability, reconstruction and partnering with the U.S. military that you would like to discuss?**

What is interesting is that I was talking to that guy I mention earlier and we were talking about the American way, birthday cards, Christmas, and the holidays, and how we indirectly impose that on the rest of the world, and it is going to be difficult to do reconstruction when they don't believe in what we believe and the way we live our lives. Some say it would be good if Saddam was still in power and it was bad for some people but it was stable .

21. **What else could be done?**

We need to have events to promote socializing and friendship amongst the military and the locals.

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## **APPENDIX D**

### **NAVY IP 1**

1. **What branch of service are you in?** U.S. Navy
2. **How long have you been in the military?** Eight years
3. **What occupational community do you belong to in your branch of service?**  
Information professional
4. **What is your age?** 30
5. **What countries have you been deployed to?**  
Iraq.... I have visited Spain, England, Malta, Greece.
6. **How many times were you deployed to the Middle East?**  
Once on boots on ground and once to the Gulf
7. **How long were your deployments?**  
Both of them were 6 months
8. **Did you interact with the local population?** No
9. **How did you interact with the local population?** N/A
10. **What issues do you believe are the most important for individual and community growth in the country you were deployed in?**  
Reducing the violence, providing security, and rebuilding critical infrastructure (railroads, electricity, sewers)
11. **What training did you receive before deployment that prepared you for interactions with other cultures?**  
I received cultural awareness training for approx two to three hours total (left hand is dirty hand, accept food or drink when offered, etc.).

12. **What training do you think would have made you more prepared for cooperative engagements with the local culture?**

N/A

13. **Are there any further issues or situations about regional stability, reconstruction and collaborating with the U.S. military that you would like to discuss?**

The number of contractors and businesses benefiting from Iraq is staggering. I was surprised by the number of contractors in noncombat roles in areas ranging from accounting to engineering. On the other hand, that shows a shift in the security situation.

## **APPENDIX E**

### **NAVY IP 2**

1. **What branch of service are you in?** US Navy
2. **How long have you been in the military?** 14 years.
3. **What occupational community do you belong to in your branch of service?**

Information Professional Community.

4. **What is your age?** 39
5. **What countries have you been deployed to?**

Misawa Japan, Iraq.

6. **How many times were you deployed to the Middle East?** 1
7. **How long were your deployments?** 1 year
8. **Did you interact with the local population?** Very little
9. **How did you interact with the local population?**

Contractors helped us move from one side (site) to another.

10. **What issues do you believe are the most important for individual and community growth in the country you were deployed in?**

Knowing the customs and beliefs of the Iraq people. Knowing their religious beliefs. Typical we just do not know the customs and beliefs. It was difficult because they didn't get the training before deploying to Iraq. So having something emplaced during training cycle would help. (IP 2)

11. **Could you help me understand how people in Turkey/Iraq/Saudi Arabia choose their friends and partners?**

Didn't get to see any interaction with the Iraq people.

12. **Who are the most influential groups in a typical social network?**

The older men (males). Especially if they are in a high positions in the church

13. **In places where outside forces, such as the United Nations or American military, are active, what opportunities and challenges does this present for people in the community?**

The Iraq people had to be careful talking or interacting with the US people because they didn't want to become a target. So they had to be careful on befriending people.

14. **Could you tell how the local people from the country you were deployed to form opinions about whether certain military actions are good or bad?**

Never discussed any military actions with the contractors or Iraq people.

15. **Following a change in government, what factors most likely lead some people to support development of their businesses and society, and what factors lead others to oppose development?**

One factor that would encourage if there were any terrorists activity in that business district

16. **What did the U.S. military do to make life better in country x or other Middle Eastern nations?**

Give gifts to an orphanage during Christmas. Helped build schools.

17. **What did the U.S. military do to make life more difficult in country x or other Middle Eastern nations?**

The Iraq people are proud people. Just the US presence makes it difficult.

18. **What training did you receive before deployment that prepared you for interactions with other cultures?**

Ten minute slide show about the Iraq people was the only training received.



19. **What training do you think would have made you more prepared for cooperative engagements with the local culture?**

Some type of briefs on how to interact with the local people in Iraq.

20. **Are there any further issues or situations about regional stability, reconstruction and partnering with the U.S. military that you would like to discuss?**

To see more military services other than the US Military. Other Countries.

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